The Pentagon, the Generals, and the Trump (47) Administration

Leadership reform done smartly

There is clearly an assessment by the incoming Trump 47 administration, and a significant portion of its political base, that the military generally—and perhaps the Army in particular—has a leadership problem. This distrust is perhaps personified in Pete Hegseth, the nominee for Secretary of Defense, who wrote a book on the subject.

It’s perhaps easiest to say that there is a “vibe shift” regarding the generals.[i] As an observer, I can discern at least three different versions of this shift. The most overly political is the response to “Diversity, Equity, Inclusion” or “DEI” initiatives inside the services. Hegseth’s take is that the excesses of DEI have weakened the military by promoting the incompetent or unfit, and thereby discouraging traditional sources of recruits—rural white men—from joining.

The second version has to do with military performance during the long wars. The ambiguous ending of the Iraq war and the undeniable failure to achieve any war aims in Afghanistan—not to mention the debacle of the withdrawal—contribute to the judgment that the generals didn’t know how to properly fight such wars, and that they were frequently deceptive to both political leadership and the American people. Senior general after senior general assured us that the Taliban was unable to hold ground against the valor of the Afghan Security Forces. Either they were utterly delusional in their assessments, or they were lying to us. Neither is acceptable and points to a need for reform.

Finally, many close observers believe that the Army (likely the other services as well) has lost its way when it comes to its core competencies. We are regularly “treated” to story after story, at post after post, about the inability of the service to adequately house and feed its soldiers—its core and more solemn duty. Whether black mold, lead paint, or asbestos, soldiers—and their families—are frequently required to live in environmentally hazardous conditions. And reports of soldiers not having food in their dining facilities to eat happen with alarming frequency—most recently at Fort Carson last month. But this isn’t a one-time thing. Similar stories were reported at Fort Cavazos (previously Fort Hood) in summer 2023. Strikingly, neither of these stories were accompanied by reports of mass “reliefs for cause” of the leadership—garrison commanders, post commanders, sergeants major—on whose watch these inexcusable failings occurred.

When these three streams interact, they bring about a significant challenge to the legitimacy of senior Army leadership. And both political commentators and candidates have risen to address this challenge. I have seen at least three approaches to this crisis proposed.

The first, by John Schindler, is perhaps the most draconian. He proposes a mass firing of all 3-star and 4-star ranks in the Pentagon, with a “safety mechanism” for each to write a one-page memo (whether to President or Secretary of Defense is unclear) explaining why they should be retained. Schindler maintains that by pruning (most of) these 200 individuals (around 40 4-star and 160 3-star) the new administration will show is “is serious about changing how the Pentagon does business” and that plenty of one and two-star officers (and then Colonels backfilling that demographic) are ready to step up into these jobs. He would then propose a similar round for the civilian Senior Executive Service (Pentagon civil servants with flag officer-like responsibilities).

The second was published in Responsible Statecraft by Steve Deal (a retired Naval Officer) entitled “Yes, US Generals Should Be Fired.” The essay is long on diagnosis, but short on solutions, and I found no discussion of just exactly who, why, how and how many generals should (per the title) be fired, though it is clear he wants someone to be. That said, there is powerful diagnosis in the essay, and it brings to light some very helpful aspects.

For example, Deal maintains that “most American do not realize that the competitive promotion board system for our military, as defined by law, ends after two-star selection.” This is true, but slightly misleading…in the wrong direction. Deal is correct that there is no “board system” for the highest two ranks, but conflating the board system that takes one to Colonel (or Navy Captain) with the board system for one- and two-star generals masks a distinction of kind.

Boards that select the promotion of officers to non-general ranks are ruthlessly objective systems, if—an important caveat—you consider the subjective “efficiency reports” in the officer’s file to be objective data. But with this limitation, the boards operate quite fairly. Members are isolated from one another and forbidden to speak to each other, so all they can do is “vote the file.” The highest and lowest scores are usually thrown out to further eliminate outlier bias. Again, if you consider the efficiency reports to be objective data, the board system (to Colonel) is ruthlessly meritocratic.

This system ends when selecting officers for one-star general. This board is instead entirely subjective. The members of the board—all generals themselves—discuss each potential selectee (or at least the realistic potential selectees—many files are set aside without a serious look) using quite subjective criteria. “I knew him when he commanded X and later when on staff at Y. I think he’ll be a good brigadier.” The board can refer to the efficiency reports…or not. As they prefer.

In short, while the lower level system is (within its limitations) ruthlessly meritocratic, selection to the general officer ranks more closely resembles being tapped to join a fraternity. Each of the senior members of the board will bring a favored candidate, who is almost certain to make the cut, regardless of actual merit.

But Deal is correct that selection to 3 and 4-star ranks don’t even have the fig leaf of a board process. Generally speaking, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs chooses the officers in “Joint” jobs (the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands), while the service chiefs choose the 3 and 4-star officers for their services. Political leadership may put a thumb on the scale in prominent cases but, for example, it will be rare for anyone other than the service chief, or Chairman, to decide who is the J8 or A4 or N1 or G3/5/7 (all 3-star jobs).

While Deal is short on recommendations, he does help pull back the curtain on the selection system for the generals. And he is correct that we should think of all generals as political appointees. Technically all military officers are, having been confirmed by the Senate (from Captain forward), but the generals even more so, having been selected by subjective and political (albeit intra-service politics) criteria.

Finally, the Wall Street Journal (among other outlets) reported shortly after the Presidential election that the transition team was considering a “Warrior Board” “of retired military personnel with the power to review three-and four-star officers and to recommend removals of any deemed unfit for leadership.” The purpose would be to purge “what [President Trump] views as failed generals.”

As I’ve laid out above, I have no issue with the idea that there are failing generals, for a host of reasons. But it will be important to use a scalpel, and not a cleaver, when trying to determine who should be purged, in both the criteria and the composition of the “deciders.”

I find the idea of a “Warrior Board” to be unhelpful for at least two reasons. First, this is putting the arsonists in charge of the firefighting. Any retired general has played a major part in selecting the current set of generals, either directly, or indirectly by selecting the generals that selected the generals (though perhaps several generations back). Putting the “graybeards” (as retired generals are often called) in charge of selection is likely to get you more of the same, particularly if these officers were service chiefs or vice-chiefs. In short, we should be suspicious of the ability of the authors of the current institutional morass to assist in reform.

Second, one should be careful in assigning guilt for prior “crimes” (metaphorically speaking) committed by the Pentagon. For example, there is clear desire on the part of President Trump to purge “those involved in the chaotic 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan.”

The general most identified with the withdrawal is then-Major General (now full, 4-star general) Chris “CD” Donahue, then commanding the 82d Airborne Division (after commanding Delta Force, among other things). Donahue was famously the last American soldier to leave Afghanistan, staying on the ground until his entire command was “in the air” from country. If you want someone “involved,” he is the guy.

But General Donahue—an officer beloved by an unusually wide range of servicemembers—is not, in my judgment, to blame.[ii] To use a somewhat salty metaphor, CD is not the guy who made the shit sandwich. He’s the guy who had to eat the shit sandwich. He is the commander who found himself placed in an unenviable and untenable situation on the ground, in which tragically difficult decisions had to be made. Decisions that I am sure haunt Donahue to this day. But don’t look at him. Look at the people who put him there. Primarily the politicals, but the Joint Staff and CENTCOM should probably be replying by endorsement.

Donahue is currently serving as a four-star general in Germany, dual-hatted as the commanding general of both US Army Europe and US Army Africa (his confirmation for this job was reportedly held up over Afghanistan concerns). Widely regarded as a unique talent, it would be a shame were his role in faithfully executing a deeply flawed policy to be held against him.

I have similar concerns about deeply emotional issues such as Covid vaccine mandates. Virtually all senior officers have had to touch first “encouraging” the taking of vaccines and then later mandating vaccines when policy changed. These commanders would similarly be responsible for separating those who refused to take “the jab.”

However—like Donahue above—these officers were faithfully, and in some cases, creatively, executing the lawful orders given to them by their civilian leadership. This should be EXACTLY what we want in serving officers. If an officer is given a lawful order by civilian leadership they should execute it, and not carry it out grudgingly and with foot dragging, but enthusiastically and with creativity in the execution. Once an order is determined to be neither illegal nor unethical (a very high bar in both cases), serving officers are put in a “theirs not to reason why, theirs not to make reply” moment. Very careful parsing should be made in these cases, because what many of the most talented officers exhibited in this case is exactly the behavior we want, even if we abhor the policy they were ordered to execute. An officer who will drag his feet on vaccination mandates may well also drag his feet when substituting his judgment on a favored policy by the next administration. The Republic needs officers who will well and faithfully discharge, to the best of their ability, the legitimate orders given to them. Any purging of the general officer ranks should be very careful not to eliminate exactly the traits it will want in the coming years.

Aside from the moral hazard of trusting retired generals to not just select more of the same, reforming the senior officer corps should have the effect of empowering the civilian leadership of the Pentagon. Should generals need to be eliminated, they should be purged by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (assuming confirmation) and/or his service secretaries. Removing senior leaders—and selecting their replacements—should be an executive decision by civilian leadership and not outsourced to some consultants, whether called a “Warrior Board” or a McKinsey team. Of course, civilian leadership can (and should) consult widely with whomever they choose, but they should “own” both any firings/retirements and the selection of the replacements. They should be building a team, by both subtraction and addition.

Finally, to return to one of my recurring soapboxes, military leadership should be looking at what the Army is doing with its Command Assessment Programs (or CAPs: CCAP for full Colonels, BCAP for Lt Colonels). I don’t think it is too strong to call this program revolutionary for the institution, as it insists on gathering data about those who will take command of its battalions and brigades. And with data comes transparency.

The CAPs came under a microscope recently, when a senior Army leader intervened into the process to ensure the selection of one of his subordinate Lieutenant Colonels for command, despite what were widely reported as dismal scores from the BCAP process. This leader’s intervention—what I referred to as “The Hamilton Affair,” was reported by the CAP cadre and after long investigation, he was relieved and retired by the current (outgoing) Army Secretary. (See my initial and final comments on this incident at links).

To reiterate, most generals do not—emphatically NOT—like the reforms that CAP brings to the command selection process (with the publication of each of those pieces I got multiple comments from retired generals assuring me that things were better in the old days). And so it surprised me not at all that several generals—retired and active—appear to be spreading the rumor to the Trump transition team that the CAPs are part of the DEI regime, and need to be purged.

Let us leave aside the fact that the CAP program was born during the Trump 45 administration. But more importantly, the events in the “Hamilton Affair” demonstrate that administering the CAP is in fact an anti-DEI program. Again, it gives data. As objective a set of data as measurement permits. What is then done with that data is, obviously, up to the institution and political leadership. It can “play it straight” with the data, it can water down the data, it can ignore the data. But the data still exists.

The Hamilton Affair can be seen as the last gasp of the old, pre-data system. In the “old days,” the institution would never have dared not give command to a black, female officer with patronage from a senior black general. But this is precisely what happened under the CAP system and what outraged General Hamilton. How dare the Army substitute objective data for his considered professional judgment? So he insisted that—in this one case—the old system of patronage be revived. And—to his shame—the Army Chief of Staff conceded. He (the CSA) initially slated this officer—whom the data stated should not be trusted with command of soldiers—for command of soldiers.

The beauty of CAP is—again—that it gathers and preserves data. And data gives transparency. The CAP system does not prevent a DEI system from being imposed. It does not prevent the Army Chief of Staff from installing a minority officer. For that matter, it does not prevent an officer with poor scores from being given command because his father was a respected general and he has the right last name. What it DOES prevent is the Army being able to say it didn’t know what it was doing. The Army can continue to put dim, and/or toxic leaders in command for whatever political reason—it just can’t claim ignorance when bad things happen because that leader was toxic and/or dim.

Speaking of transparency, the Human Resources Command CG, Major General Hope Rampy, published on January 16, 2025, a memo that lays out how commanders were selected at the most recent boards, for both Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels. The memo contains interesting data. Bottom line—for the most recent selection for LTCs, BCAP performance was 60% of the total input, with prior performance (read: the old board system evaluating your efficiency reports) being 40%. For Colonels, the input was 50/50. Rampy provides interesting justification for the discrepancy between the two--that for (most) Lieutenant Colonels, recent performance is staff time, and other assignments, as it has usually been eight years since officers commanded their companies. While for Colonels, since recent performance includes battalion command, an analogous experience to brigade command, it makes sense to give that more weight. I had not previously considered this argument, and I have to admit it makes sense. I think I would still prefer the selection for Colonel command—which is essentially your audition for General—to give more weight to the skill set that generals will require. But by laying out the argument, MG Rampy has at least given us ground on which people of good will can disagree. Again, transparency.

So to loop back around, I think we can all concur that there is a crisis of leadership at the Pentagon. However, I do not think that either wholesale firings or deferring to some “warrior board” of greybeards is the answer. Instead, Secretary Hegseth (again, presuming confirmation) and his team should trim as shallow as possible but as deep as necessary to assert civilian control over the Pentagon. They should then think about a more active role for civilian leadership in the selection of generals at lower (one- and two-star) levels. But this team should recognize the Army’s Command Assessment Program as the best tool to evaluate and promote talent over time. As I’ve said elsewhere, the beauty of these programs is that they “radiate” both up and down the institution. At lower levels, they inform the company grade officers as to what the institution expects of commanders. And demographic replacement will eventually ensure that every general officer will have gone through the BCAP and/or CCAP crucible (though this may take another decade).

The Trump 47 administration has been left a mess. Active conflicts by proxies in the Middle East and Europe have drained resources that may be required for a direct conflict in East Asia. The defense industrial base is a shell of its former self and in deep need of reform—the shipyards in particular. The role of the Army in these conflicts is very unclear, the lessons to be drawn from the wars in Karabakh, Ukraine, and Gaza are ambiguous, and the strategic failure in Afghanistan looms large over the institution. It will be incumbent to have the right leadership for the coming challenges.

Finding exactly who that should—and should not—be will be the first major challenge of the Trump 47 Defense Department.

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[i] The vibe shift most definitely includes the admirals as well! But others are far better equipped than am I to discuss the Navy’s problems, which are equally deep and will require a much longer timeline to fix.

[ii] I have never (to my knowledge) met General Donahue in person. I write this from his sterling reputation attested to by many officers and soldiers whose judgment I trust.